



LEBANON'S ARMED FORCES AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, 1948–49

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In military histories of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Lebanon's role, however minor, is almost entirely missing. This article seeks to fill this gap with a detailed examination of the involvement in the war not only of Lebanon's army but also of the irregular forces—notably the Arab Liberation Army—operating separately from its territory. The analysis—which covers the military and political constraints affecting both actors, their military performance, and the implications of their performance—is located within the historiographical debate on the 1948 war, and more specifically within the context of the Israeli “new history” approach of debunking the David versus Goliath argument.

IN THEIR 2001 EDITED VOLUME *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948* that examined the part played by the protagonists in the 1948–49 Arab-Israeli war, Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim noted (p. 8) the difficulty that they had in finding an author to analyze Lebanon's role in the conflict. Consequently, Lebanon was the one regional warring state left out of the book. Indeed, it is typically a footnote in accounts of the war, not least because the fighting in the Galilee theatre was so slight compared to the battles on the Egyptian and Jordanian fronts. This article is an attempt to fill this gap in the historiography by examining Lebanon's army as well as the irregular forces—notably the Arab League's Arab Liberation Army (ALA)—that operated from or near Lebanese territory with the official or tacit support of the Lebanese government. There were also 225–250 Palestinian volunteers serving with the Lebanese army for the duration of the war. Finally, the Syrian army operated some units out of Bint Jubayl in southern Lebanon.

This analysis is located within the historiographical debate on the formation of Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict thereafter. Put simply, there are four historiographical perspectives on the issue. Initially, work from (generally Arab) scholars such as 'Arif al-'Arif and Walid Khalidi challenged the Israeli and Western pro-Israeli “old” history championed by Israeli official histories—and the likes of Chaim Herzog, Jon and David Kimche, Dan Kurzman, Natanel Lorch, and Edgar O'Balance—whereby Israel bears little responsibility for the Palestinian

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refugee crisis and the subsequent Arab-Israeli conflict. Then, in the late 1980s, using Israeli and Western archival sources, “new” (generally Israeli) historians such as Simha Flapan, Benny Morris, Ilan Pappé, and Avi Shlaim also challenged the arguments of the “old” history in a way that, broadly speaking, drew closer to the original Arab narrative. (Palestinian scholar Nur Masalha, meanwhile, using the same archival sources as the “new” historians, focused on thinking within the Zionist movement before 1948 about the “transfer” of Palestinians out of what would become Israel.) In response to the “new” history, in the 1990s “new-old” historians and media commentators such as Efraim Karsh and Aharon Megged came to the defence of Israel and the “old” history, provoking a bitter debate, often within a nonacademic media setting.

As part of the “new” history approach, *War for Palestine* undermines the “David versus Goliath” argument at the heart of the “old” history, wherein the Israeli “David” fought against and defeated the “Goliath” of five united Arab national armies—Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Transjordan—joined by the ALA, Hajj Amin al-Husayni’s Holy War Army, Palestinian irregular forces, contingents from other Arab countries, Yugoslavian Muslim volunteers, Ustasa and SS officers, and British army deserters serving with the Arabs. Yet, threatened on all fronts—including the Lebanese front—Israel triumphed, setting up a narrative of itself as the underdog in an unequal struggle with more powerful neighbors.

LEBANON AND THE LEBANESE ARMY

In Lebanon in 1943, Maronite Christians such as Bishara al-Khoury worked with pan-Arabists such as Riad al-Solh to create the National Pact, an unwritten understanding that helped pave the way for independence from French colonial rule in 1945–46. The National Pact committed the country’s Christian and Muslim communities to an independent Lebanon in which power would be shared by the various religious (or confessional) groups. The pact meant that the Christians accepted the end of French rule, while the Muslims renounced their goal of becoming part of a greater Arab state with Syria. When Lebanon joined the Arab League in 1945, it preserved its independence but as part of a wider Arab community of nations, it now had an obligation toward Palestine that would drag it into war with Israel in 1948.

Not all Maronites were reconciled to the new Lebanon. Some, such as former president (under the French) Emile Eddé and Maronite church leaders Monsignor Ignace Mubarak and Patriarch Antun Arida, opposed Lebanon’s new identity and sought local allies in their struggle to maintain Christian dominance in Lebanon. Finding common cause with the Jewish Yishuv as minorities in an overwhelmingly Muslim region, Mubarak tried to develop links with Zionists before and during the 1948 war, while Eddé raised the possibility of a Christian revolt in Beirut if Israel entered southern Lebanon. It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the Maronite-Zionist connection, but the active hostility of parts of the Maronite community to any war with Israel does highlight one

of the many internal tensions that restricted Lebanon's options in 1948. The Maronite Right—in particular the militant political party the Phalange—had a well-established bond with Zionism stretching back to March 1920 and continuing with high-level discussions in the 1930s and 1940s that culminated in a May 1946 understanding between the Jewish Agency and the Maronite Patriarchate. Some Maronites continued throughout the 1948–49 war to hold secret meetings with the Israelis, who provided them with financial support. While there is no concrete evidence to support a “collusion across the Litani” thesis between the Maronites and Zionism akin to Shlaim's *Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullab, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine* (1988), there is no doubt that the opposition of some sections of Lebanese society (notably Maronites but including some Druze) combined with weak military capabilities to curtail the involvement of the Lebanese armed forces in 1948–49.

In some ways, the Lebanese army was almost as new as Israel's. In August 1945, units of the French *Troupes Spéciales du Levant* became the army of Lebanon. There then began a period of reorganization, as the newly formed Lebanese Ministry of Defense appointed senior officers and created an army headquarters. The new Maronite commander, Fuad Chehab, taking charge of a fractured force “without staff, departments, military police, military courts, or anything which constituted a general headquarters,” had to create a complete command infrastructure before the army could become effective.¹ Moreover, as the *Troupes Spéciales* had included Syrians as well as Lebanese, once the French-led force became the Lebanese army, all the Syrians had to leave, effective 23 August 1945. Though by 4 January 1947, Chehab was able to issue orders defining the various sections and departments of the new army, it was not until 1950 that he promulgated the new Lebanese army code.

By 1948, the Lebanese army had four infantry battalions—*Bataillons de Chasseurs Libanais*—one artillery battalion with a mix of 75- and 105-mm. guns, one armored battalion, a group of cavalry, plus transport, engineering, and medical support units.² The Lebanese unit war diaries show that in May–June 1948 the infantry battalions averaged 500–550 men, with a total of about 450 effective soldiers per battalion.³ Each battalion had three infantry companies plus a “heavy” company of 60- and 81-mm. mortars. The artillery battalion comprised two batteries—one of 75s and one of 105s—while the armored battalion had nine armored cars and nine Renault light tanks that had survived the desert battle of Bir Hakeim in 1942.⁴ This gives a total strength for the army, including support troops and volunteers, of around 3,000 (certainly not more than 3,500) men, many of whom were not combat troops, plus two batteries of artillery and eighteen armored vehicles. In effect, Lebanon had one infantry brigade with limited support arms for the war with Israel. In terms of deployment against Israel, the war diaries show that three infantry battalions (1st, 2d, and 3d) were at different times stationed along the frontier, but that only one (the 3d) was actually used in battle. It is not clear whether the 4th battalion played any part in the war.

The Lebanese army was not ready when the war with Israel broke out on 15 May 1948. Its program for reorganization and re-equipment was so backward that, in May 1949, two months after the war had ended, it was still taking its “first steps towards standardizing, modernizing, and increasing equipment and reorganizing” so that its soldiers would have new weapons to replace the “miscellaneous small arms used hitherto” and lorries to replace horses.⁵ The army was also experiencing great difficulty in buying new equipment, partly because of a shortage of government funding, partly due to an arms embargo. Thus, as late as July 1949 the Lebanese were still negotiating to buy American Sherman tanks to replace their obsolete French ones.⁶

Until the war with Israel, the Lebanese army was more of a police force than an offensive military force, not least because its main duties involved assisting the police and gendarmes in internal security, control of political opposition, and anti-bandit operations. It was, in effect, the police force of “last resort,” there to protect state officials and to umpire elections.⁷

Anti-bandit operations were a particular distraction in 1948–49, just when the army needed to focus all its energy on prosecuting the war with Israel. Thus, on 7 May 1948, 150 men of the 3d battalion—soon to be in battle with the Israelis—went to Baalbek to help the police maintain order, returning to the front on 11 May.⁸ In December 1948, the army was again heavily involved in ongoing battles with bandits in the Ras Baalbek area, where it performed badly, provoking an official inquiry

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into the defeat and deaths of army personnel. The strain of these anti-bandit operations was considerable, forcing the Lebanese high command to rotate and provide rest for the troops involved. Much of the bandit activity was indistinguishable from clan feuding compounded by religious differences in rural areas of Lebanon—often over hashish production—but still required the redeployment of whole battalions such as the 2d and 3d battalions from the southern front with Israel. Finally, following various border incidents, the Lebanese army also had to confront a potential threat from Syria, to the extent that, in May 1949, it was laying anti-tank mines and digging in anti-tank guns north of Tripoli against possible Syrian army incursions.

The National Pact of 1943 had fixed that the head of the army would always be a Maronite and the chief of staff a Druze. More generally, the officer corps of the Lebanese army was overwhelmingly Maronite, especially as Muslim officers in the *Troupes Spéciales* had nearly all been Syrians who left to join the newly formed Syrian army in 1945–46⁹ and because French policies had encouraged heavy Christian recruitment into the *Troupes Spéciales* in the 1920s and 1930s.¹⁰ Under the French, Sunni Muslims, who were generally well educated, had “boycotted” military service, while poorer Shia Muslims, who saw the army as a means of career advancement, were “almost all in the lower ranks.”¹¹ This pattern of recruitment did not change under Chehab; indeed, it became more pronounced. In Chehab’s new professional army, the entry

criteria for the officer corps were: Lebanese citizenship, a Baccalaureate, no criminal record, and successful performance on a battery of tests.¹² This meant that between 1945 and 1958, new officers were overwhelmingly Christian, with the poorly educated Shias unable to meet the educational requirements and the Sunnis continuing to stay away. To break the Maronites' hold on the army, Lebanese Muslims pushed for compulsory military service, which the Christians opposed on the grounds that "Lebanon cannot afford the luxury of a large standing army."¹³ It was for this reason that the Muslims of Lebanon saw their national army "as a Christian Army."¹⁴

While it is a moot point whether the Maronites' dominance of the army had a direct impact on its performance in 1948–49, it is worth noting that this was a conclusion drawn by contemporary observers and is a perspective supported by some historical evidence. As early as 1947, American diplomats in Beirut reported to the State Department that Lebanon was unlikely to go to war against Israel because the Christian half of the population

would ever serve as a dampening counterpoise to Moslem enthusiasts. The most likely surmise is that Lebanon, unless its own interests are in direct jeopardy, will settle down to living reasonably good grace with a neighbouring Jewish state. Guerrilla warfare in Palestine may even continue for long months, but except for volunteers—whose numbers will never be great in this country—it is highly doubtful that Lebanon will be a springboard for a new Thirty Years War against Zion.¹⁵

One leading Maronite went so far as to tell U.S. diplomats that the Lebanese army would "never attack Jews unless attacked first."¹⁶ Meanwhile, Israeli intelligence reports from May 1948 confirmed to the Israeli high command that it had little to fear in Galilee as the Lebanese army was avoiding any attacks on Jewish border settlements.¹⁷ Moshe Zak, an Israeli military correspondent at Metulla on the Lebanese border, claimed that there were no Maronites among the soldiers who crossed the border into Israel.¹⁸ Furthermore, under pressure from Maronite clergy, Chehab rejected Defense Minister Emir Majid Arslan's demands that Lebanon coordinate its military operations with Syria and refused permission for Christians in his army to join the Syrian army.¹⁹ Nor did Chehab provide much succour for irregular Arab forces operating in northern Galilee. On 8 June 1948, he issued an order that effectively prevented mujahidin fighters from entering Lebanon from Palestine/Israel by requiring them to surrender their arms at the border and obtain an identity card and a pass from their superiors and the Lebanese high command.²⁰ On 11 June, he strictly applied the ceasefire called for by the United Nations, ordering his men not to fire unless fired upon and forbidding them to go beyond the ceasefire line. The Lebanese army was to remain in position on its side of the border and "fight only if forced to reply to Jewish attacks."²¹ Indeed, even when Israeli forces occupied

villages on the Lebanese side of the border, the Lebanese army did nothing, prompting one Lebanese officer to express his “dissatisfaction [with the] inability to resist Jewish aggression because of small Lebanese armed forces and administration[']s passive attitude.”²²

Leaving aside the contentious issue of the commitment of some Lebanese senior officers and politicians to the war, what is certain is that the confessional and inchoate nature of the army, combined with a weak order-of-battle, hampered effective military operations. This was, after all, a “national” army whose primary mission was not to fight external enemies but to help preserve the “military institution as a pressure tool in the hands of the traditionalist politicians.”²³

WAR WITH ISRAEL

Once the war broke out on 15 May 1948, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) of the newly formed state launched a series of relatively well-coordinated offensives around Jerusalem and Latrun against Jordanian forces, in Galilee against the Syrians and Lebanese, and in the south around Gaza and Beersheba against Egypt. Although there was a truce from 10–11 June to 8 July and intermittently thereafter, Israeli attacks and counterattacks continued until March 1949 when a final operation in the south (Uvdeh) took the IDF to the Red Sea and what would become Eilat, thus concluding the war. During this period, immigration to Israel—often of combat-aged people, many with military experience—boosted the capabilities of the IDF, as did a shrewd arms-buying policy. As the “new” historians have noted, by late 1948 IDF strength had increased to some 100,000 soldiers (though not all were front-line troops), a force strength that outmatched the combined field forces of the Arabs, which never exceeded 20,000–25,000.

In Galilee in the north—the zone of operations for the Lebanese—the UN partition plan of 1947 had given most of the area to the Arabs, including Nazareth, and it was this central Galilee “tongue” that Israel was keen to occupy so that it could extend its borders and clear a route through to Israeli settlements in the upper Jordan region around Tiberias and Metulla. This led to a series of Haganah offensives in Galilee: Yiftach (April 1948), Matateh (May 1948), Ben Ami (May 1948), Dekel (July 1948), and Hiram (October 1948). By early November 1948, the Israelis had taken all of the Galilee territory allotted to the Arabs by the UN in 1947, and tens of thousands of Palestinians in Galilee were forced into exile, thus paving the way for postwar Jewish settlement of the area.

Traditional historiography makes much of the three invasion routes from Lebanon into Galilee: Metulla in the far northeast, Ras al-Naqura on the coast and, between the two, the Palestinian village of Malikiyya near the Lebanese border.²⁴ An attack through Metulla would bring the Lebanese army into a flat zone where there were Jewish settlements; it was also an invasion route with reasonably good road connections to Beirut that could help sustain any

logistical train in a long war. Ras al-Naqura on the coast had road and rail connections to Beirut and provided a jumping-off point for any force wanting to threaten major towns such as Acre and Haifa. Malikiyya, while lacking metalled road access to Beirut, provided access to the bottom of the Galilee “finger” which, if crossed, would isolate Jewish settlements in the Metulla area and would bring Arab forces onto the flat Galilee panhandle from where they could launch further attacks. In the end, the Lebanese launched a half-hearted attack through the least threatening of the three: Malikiyya. At the start of the war, it was not clear that the Lebanese would do even this.

As part of the general Arab assault on Israel, the Lebanese army after 10–11 May 1948 was tasked with attacking down the coast from Ras al-Naqura to Acre and then on to ‘Afule, where it was to combine with the Syrian, Iraqi, and Jordanian armies to detach Galilee and threaten Israel with strategic envelopment.²⁵ But at the outset of the war, on 14–15 May, Chehab, instead of launching his army on this ambitious attack, pleaded Lebanon’s military weakness and Israel’s occupation of Malikiyya to request that the Arab high command redefine Lebanon’s role as one of defense; simultaneously, he lobbied Lebanon’s politicians to the same end.²⁶ Chehab seems to have made this decision some time before; on 2 May, U.S. diplomats cabled that while some Lebanese troops had moved to the frontier, “they had specific orders against crossing into Palestine or using their arms from Lebanese territory against persons in Palestine. Have no evidence orders have been changed or violated.”²⁷ President al-Khoury was also disinclined to go to war with Israel, and on 14 May agreed with Chehab’s decision not to attack.²⁸ As the Arab high command recognized that Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan would do the real fighting while Lebanon and Syria harassed Israel, Chehab was able to ignore the joint plan to attack Israel on 15 May.²⁹ On 18 May, the Lebanese Ministry of Defense issued a communiqué stating that it had deployed the army defensively to stop attacks by a superior enemy all along the border.³⁰ By 25 May 1948, Lebanese troops had “taken defensive positions barely inside Palestine and they will not be called upon to take offense according [to] present plans.”³¹ Thus, instead of crossing the border at al-Naqura as part of the strategic envelopment of Israel, Lebanese army units on 19 May dug in at al-Naqura, on their side of the frontier.³²

In the end, the threat to Lebanese and Syrian prestige if the IDF were to win, the presence of ALA troops in southern Lebanon, aggressive Israeli cross-border raids targeting bridges and supply dumps across southern Lebanon, and agitation from Muslim Lebanese such as the Shia leader in southern Lebanon, Ahmad al-As‘ad (whose house the Israelis had blown up), forced Chehab to make a token attack on Israel.³³ In addition, with a truce impending for 10–11 June, it was politic for the Lebanese army to be seen as doing something before the war ended so as to please supporters of the war inside the country and maintain Lebanon’s standing in fora such as the Arab League. This led to the Lebanese army’s sole engagement with Israel, at the village of Malikiyya on 5–6 June 1948.

THE BATTLE OF MALIKIYYA

Located 700 meters over the border inside Palestine/Israel, the village of Malikiyya was a crossing point between the two countries, defended during the British Mandate by a blockhouse complex on the hill just north of the village. The road crossing the border—still extant and signposted for Malikiyya on the Lebanese side but now blocked by a UNIFIL post and the closed frontier—passed by the blockhouse and skirted the village, heading east to Qadas and Nabi Yusha'. There, a police fort, again from the Mandate period, defended the passing point for traffic from the hills onto the plain of Galilee. The 1st battalion of the Yiftach brigade attacked Malikiyya on 12 May, capturing it on 13–14 May.³⁴ The Israelis were forced out of the village in a running battle on 15–16 May, but occupied Nabi Yusha' on 16–17 May and held it. The Israelis retook Malikiyya on 28–29 May with an attack from the rear through Lebanese territory.³⁵

Though some accounts put 3,000 Lebanese at Malikiyya in May 1948 (out-numbering the Israelis 6-to-1), Lebanese unit war diaries and contemporary newspapers show that before 5 June there was no Lebanese military presence in the village aside from some Lebanese volunteers and a liaison officer (Major Muhammad Zughayb). Beyond the parochial resistance of Palestinian village militias, fighting in Galilee was being waged by the ALA (in Arabic, the Salvation Army) commanded in the field by the Lebanese officer Fawzi al-Qawuqji but under the overall command, at different times, of Iraqi and Lebanese officers such as Isma'il Safwat and Shawqat Shuqayr. From January 1948, the ALA had fought in the Jerusalem-Jaffa-Nablus theatre before being redeployed in May through Syria to Galilee. It was the ALA's 2d Yarmuk battalion, under the command of Lt.-Col. Adib al-Shishakli, later president of Syria,³⁶ that had taken Malikiyya from the Israelis earlier in May,³⁷ before losing it again at the end of the month.

By the time the Lebanese army launched its attack on Malikiyya on 5 June, the Yiftach brigade had been withdrawn south to serve on the Jerusalem front. Its replacement was the recently formed Oded brigade.³⁸ Short of men and equipment, the Oded brigade was a "fledgling"³⁹ unit: "a ragtag organization composed mainly of home guardsmen and other defense groups."⁴⁰ This meant that when, at 10:00 A.M. on 5 June, 436 Lebanese soldiers of the 3d battalion gathered for an attack on Malikiyya, they would not be up against the toughest opposition.⁴¹ By 1:00 P.M., the three companies of the 3d battalion were in position for an assault on the defences around the village. The subsequent battle was over by about 5:30–6:00 P.M., the Lebanese pushing back the Israelis, who withdrew from Malikiyya. During the IDF pullout, which was completed by midnight, there was some skirmishing, after which the Lebanese entered Malikiyya and the neighboring village of Qadas.

Traditional accounts of the 1948 war make some play of the Malikiyya battle, emphasizing the stakes involved, especially in conjunction with Syrian attacks

against the Israeli settlement of Mishmar HaYarden in the upper Jordan Valley and the alleged Syrian plan to “advance westwards in conjunction with Lebanese attacks from the north” in order to hook up “both with the Lebanese forces in the north and Kaukji’s Arab Liberation Army in the west. . . . Then the way to Safed would be open.”⁴² The idea of a coordinated assault is nonsense. The Lebanese not only failed to combine with the Syrians but they fought the Malikiyya battle as a “positional attack” rather than one of maneuver and exploitation.⁴³ Indeed, the Lebanese 3d battalion had been ordered to take Malikiyya, nothing more.⁴⁴ Thus the Lebanese did not exploit their success on 5–6 June by moving through Nabi Yusha’ (one of the three invasion routes into Israel) across the flat land of the Galilee finger to link up with the Syrians.⁴⁵ By taking Malikiyya, the Lebanese army had put the key in the lock, but by refusing to move on Nabi Yusha’ it failed to turn the key to open the door. The Lebanese did not even attack nearby Israeli border settlements such as Ramot Naftali; the only threat to these settlements came from ALA troops.⁴⁶

However, if one accepts the argument that the Lebanese high command was neither interested in a serious battle with the IDF nor militarily capable of sustaining such an attack, the Malikiyya operation becomes more understandable. A local tactical assault on Malikiyya posed little strategic threat to the Israelis and avoided the risk of the Lebanese army becoming tangled up in Israeli border settlements—as would happen at Metulla—which would have forced the Israeli high command to make a rapid and decisive response to save its people.

At all events, the Lebanese army handed Malikiyya and Qadas over to the ALA on 8 July and returned to its side of the border.⁴⁷ Malikiyya was a symbolic battle designed to impress the wider Arab world and meet the demand from many Lebanese Muslims that something be done to help the Palestinians.⁴⁸ Ideally, what the Lebanese government needed was one “dignified battle” against the Israelis that would give its army recognition among the Lebanese population, help assuage inflamed public opinion, and provide a symbolic victory before any peace talks.⁴⁹ Thus, much was made of the Malikiyya “victory” in the Lebanese press, radio, and official communiqués, with emphasis on the hard-fought

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nature of the engagement and a supposed 25-kilometer advance into Palestine. While in reality the battle had claimed only eight Israeli lives⁵⁰ (two Lebanese soldiers, plus Zughayb, were also killed⁵¹)—numbers that do not suggest a hard-fought battle—Lebanese claims of Israeli dead reached a wildly exaggerated 92–100.⁵² On 9 June, the Lebanese held a victory parade in Bint Jubayl in southern Lebanon to celebrate Malikiyya, a celebration attended by Arslan, Chehab, al-Khoury, and al-Solh before the various dignitaries went on a tour of the battle-

field. At Bint Jubayl, Lebanese soldiers were paraded, medals distributed, photographs taken, the 3d battalion was praised, and flag.⁵³ The heroes of Malikiyya included al-Qawuqji, who received the National Cedar Medal for the part played

by the ALA at the battle.⁵⁴ In effect, by 9 June, the war for the Lebanese army, which had begun on 5 June, was over.

THE ARAB LIBERATION ARMY VERSUS THE IDF: OPERATIONS DEKEL AND HIRAM

The fight against Israel in Galilee now passed back to the ALA, which bore the brunt of the fighting against the IDF until the war's end. The Arab League had raised the ALA in September–October 1947 as a force of 3,000 irregulars based at Qatana near Damascus, appointing al-Qawuqji field commander on 6 December. Before going to Galilee to help secure the areas allotted to the Arabs by the UN partition plan of November 1947, the ALA had served on the West Bank—pulling out in mid-May when Transjordanian and Iraqi forces arrived to take over the front. In Galilee, the ALA comprised scattered units called “battalions” but which were really beefed-up company sized formations of 200–300 men. Trevor N. Dupuy details nine battalions plus six companies totalling 7,700 men and equipped with light weapons, gas masks, uniforms, trucks, and artillery; Khalidi's listing of eight battalions of 3,830 men is a more accurate figure.⁵⁵ The ALA was largely trained and equipped by Iraq and Syria, with some help from Lebanon when it came to deploying the force to Galilee in May–June 1948.

Traditional accounts portray the ALA as a potent force, part of a united front arrayed against Israel, which used regular officers and NCOs to turn out “a thousand new soldiers each month” from Qatana.⁵⁶ One author raises the hypothesis that Qawuqji's forces, “reorganized and reequipped by Lebanon,” might have won: “If he defeated the Israelis, Lebanon could claim some territory in northern Palestine; if he lost, it could disclaim responsibility for the setback.”⁵⁷ Another affirms that the ALA “threatened Jewish communications in the whole of northeast Palestine” as the central Galilee was a *point d'appui*, for any aggressive and well-equipped Arab force.⁵⁸ A vivid account of al-Qawuqji's entry into Galilee on 7 June 1948 describes how, “to the cheers and applause of Arab villages,” Qawuqji

zoomed by jeep from one advancing column to the other, waved to the welcoming crowds whose adoration he had finally rewon. Fanning to the west and east, his troops, as he had pledged, finally smashed into Nazareth on June 11, just before the United Nations-imposed ceasefire. Kaoukji was ecstatic, though he was a bit ruffled that the Jews were too busy elsewhere to put up more than a token defence.⁵⁹

Closer examination of the ALA shows that it had neither political backing nor military cohesion. On the West Bank, rather than being a military striking force, it had been a political counterweight to an expansionist Transjordan, a point made in *War for Palestine*.⁶⁰ Thus, when the ALA went to Galilee, it had little

combat experience beyond “casual attacks” on Jewish settlers. It also arrived weighed down by a legacy of political infighting between Syria and Transjordan that had dogged its performance on the West Bank.⁶¹ ALA soldiers were of mixed caliber, the Muslim Brotherhood claiming that the ALA’s ranks were filled with “unemployed workers” responsible for robbery and rape against Arabs and that the force had been established not to fight Israel but to calm the Arab masses and counter Hajj Amin al-Husayni’s Holy War Army.⁶² The Arab League never allotted it an assigned budget, and it suffered from a poor training regime at its base at Qatana.⁶³ Because of the number of volunteers and the insufficient numbers of drill staff, Qatana became a transit rather than training camp, sending recruits to their units and to the front line after only three days’ training. As a result, ALA soldiers were unable to fight well at night or work modern military equipment and had no fire discipline, continuing to fire in battle until all the ammunition had been expended. (“Abused” is the expression used in ALA files.)⁶⁴ Soldiers also disobeyed orders and unilaterally left their positions. When the ALA was successful, there was no follow-up. Instead, troops would halt while the senior commander was called forward to accompany any journalists present to survey the battlefield, after which everyone would retreat, happy, leaving the field of battle for the enemy to reoccupy.⁶⁵ The ALA lacked the cadre of officers that might have corrected these deficiencies, especially as the Syrian officers brought in to provide leadership left on 15 May to join the Syrian army. From then on, junior officers or volunteers “with no military experience whatsoever” tried to provide leadership for the ALA in the field.⁶⁶ As one Arab author aptly noted, the ALA was the product of “ignorant theoreticians” who knew nothing about mobilizing people for an army.⁶⁷

Al-Qawuqji himself was convinced that the redeployment of his force from the West Bank to Galilee had been determined not by military strategy but by Syria’s desire to push the ALA away from Damascus and “into a dangerous, critical situation in which it will be wiped out.”⁶⁸ He even claimed that senior commanders in Syria kept his men short of equipment and deployed them to Lebanon and then Galilee without his knowledge: going out to lunch with his family, he had been perplexed to pass his men heading off to Beirut singing war songs. While it is true that Syria and Lebanon sidelined al-Qawuqji, it is also true that his abilities as a military commander were questionable.⁶⁹ He had served with the Ottomans in World War I, with the Arabs in the Palestine Revolt (1936–39), and with Rashid ‘Ali in Iraq (1941), but none of these postings involved up-to-date staff work or gave any evidence of a commander with military “grip.” One disappointed Arab officer recalled that al-Qawuqji was capable of commanding only irregular bands in a local revolt,⁷⁰ while senior Lebanese ministers commented that his political aspirations outweighed his military abilities.⁷¹

Compounding such deficiencies, the Arab League reduced the size of the ALA in June 1948 to ensure that every man had a rifle and in July actually cut it in half because it could not pay all the men.⁷² The lack of support, poor command, collapsing morale, and shortages of equipment meant that when

Israel moved to conquer the central Galilee area during Operation Dekel (8–18 July) the ALA fell apart,⁷³ withdrawing without giving battle, according to one source, and incurring very few military casualties.⁷⁴ Indeed, in the first few days of Dekel, the whole of central Galilee and Nazareth fell to the IDF⁷⁵ Al-Qawuqji, despairing at the lack of support, resigned as commander of the ALA in early August 1948, only to return, under pressure from Saudi Arabia, on 25 August.⁷⁶ By September–October 1948 ammunition stocks had fallen to 18 rounds per British rifle, 45 rounds per French rifle, and 650 rounds per machine gun.⁷⁷ ALA depots were short of parts for the few vehicles available, while the lack of trained men meant that no one was able to operate a wireless set sent by the Syrians.⁷⁸ Lacking food, basic field equipment, and shelter and suffering from diseases such as diphtheria, the men of the ALA were deserting en masse, getting drunk, firing off their weapons, and harassing visiting officials.⁷⁹

The dénouement came that autumn when Israel launched its final four-brigade offensive in Galilee, Operation Hiram (28–31 October), one of its largest single offensives of the war. By the time the operation began, the ALA was no more than dwindling, ill-disciplined bands

Lacking food, basic field equipment, and shelter and suffering from diseases such as diphtheria, the men of the ALA were deserting en masse.

of irregulars. On 25 October, just days before Hiram was launched, the commander of the Yarmuk battalion informed al-Qawuqji that his unit was down to 17 rounds per rifle, out of food, and that the men were complaining.⁸⁰ ALA units were spread exceedingly thin, with one battalion responsible for 60 kilometers of front. The very day of the attack, al-Qawuqji telegraphed Chehab that the ALA battalion in Malikiyya had insufficient ammunition for offense or defense; in fact, not even enough to make up a “fire team.”⁸¹ ALA ammunition stocks were consumed almost immediately and the battle quickly became a rout.⁸² By 30 October, al-Qawuqji was asking for water tankers as his ALA soldiers were deserting for lack of water.⁸³ UN observers passing through the battle zone reported that “there was evidently very little fighting during the Jewish advance, the Kaukji forces having withdrawn during the night of 29–30 and 30–31 October.”⁸⁴ Hiram became a *sauve qui peut*, with most of the ALA soldiers managing to escape the closing pincers of the IDF in their speedy retreat to Lebanon.⁸⁵ Unpaid ALA soldiers seem to have sold their weapons to the Lebanese—Lebanese police arrested by the ALA were found with ALA weapons and ammunition—thus rather reversing the traditional view of Lebanon supporting the ALA.⁸⁶

The casualty figures for Hiram suggest that this was, militarily speaking, a walkover for the Israelis. In a four-brigade attack, the Israelis suffered “hardly any casualties.”⁸⁷ Another source describes IDF losses as “absurdly light,” while the *Palestine Post* noted that 500 square miles of territory was taken for the loss of ten men.⁸⁸ The IDF history talks about the ALA withdrawing but has almost nothing to say about any real fighting.⁸⁹ In the Carmeli brigade history, there is no discussion of casualties during Hiram, but a roll of honor of the dead in an appendix lists seven brigade soldiers as losses for the period 28–31

October 1948.⁹⁰ Most of the Carmeli brigade dead were from June 1948 or earlier, suggesting that the considerable losses suffered by Israel in the 1948–49 war occurred in other areas of combat and at other times.⁹¹ The fact that the ALA 1st Yarmuk battalion in the period 29–31 October lost just three dead suggests that total Arab losses may well have included civilians, some of whom, if ALA files are to be believed, were raped.⁹²

Lebanon did very little to help the ALA during Dekel and Hiram. An IDF spokesperson reported to the press at the time that the ALA had no direct support from the Lebanese army during Dekel, just some supplies and artillery support.⁹³ Even this is contestable, as beyond some broken-down Lebanese tanks, the ALA (as has been seen) was permanently short of arms and ammunition in this period.⁹⁴ When Qawuqji, in some desperation, asked the Lebanese for weapons shortly before Operation Dekel, all he was offered were some surplus French ones.⁹⁵ The Israelis were clearly aware of Lebanon's passivity: orders to the IDF brigade commanders on 4 September noted that the Lebanese army was on its side of the border in a defensive deployment.⁹⁶ The Lebanese army disputes ALA claims that its requests for Lebanese artillery support were refused,⁹⁷ but U.S. diplomats noted on 28 October that "Lebanese Army Headquarters has issued orders to KAUKJI forces to withdraw."⁹⁸ The ALA was told to withdraw from Malikiyya and Blida (inside Lebanon) as well, after which "the Lebanese army insisted that it [the ALA] avoid battle at its borders."⁹⁹ Lebanon was also quick to pass on messages from the UN "ordering" al-Qawuqji to stop fighting.¹⁰⁰ Israeli sources suggest a "live and let live" system: the IDF in Hiram was not to involve the Lebanese army; Lebanon ignored three requests by the ALA for artillery support; the Lebanese army took special care to avoid combat with IDF, even on Lebanese territory; and the Lebanese army withdrew from areas that the IDF did not intend to occupy.¹⁰¹ The lack of Lebanese involvement meant that, at the end of the war, when prisoners were exchanged, the 36 Lebanese POWs passed back in exchange for six Israelis were almost all ALA personnel.¹⁰²

With Operation Hiram, the Israelis took all of the Galilee territory allotted to the Arabs by the UN under the November 1947 partition plan. After the battle, the IDF kept up its momentum and advanced into Lebanon. David Ben-Gurion stopped the advance at the Litani River, despite strong requests from Carmel and Mordechai Maklef, the IDF Northern Front's Chief of Operations, to give them 12 hours to get to Beirut.¹⁰³ In their push to the Litani, the IDF was "molested less by Kaoukji's men than by aggressive Levantine salesmen armed with fountain pens, nylons, and souvenir trinkets from the markets of Tyre and Beirut."¹⁰⁴ The Israeli occupation of parts of southern Lebanon continued into 1949, it being used primarily as a bargaining counter by the Israelis in the armistice talks in 1949 with Syria.¹⁰⁵ The armistice between Israel and Lebanon on 23 March 1949 marked the end of hostilities: "There is general satisfaction that [a] Lebanon-Israeli armistice has been signed and as Lebanon only wanted [its] own territory returned and recognition that hostilities do not exist, there is [a] feeling of relief that [the] situation is settled."¹⁰⁶

CONCLUSION

When reflecting on Lebanon's part in the 1948 war, perhaps the question to be asked is not just how and why Lebanon did so little to help the Palestinians, but what impact this had on the prosecution of the war. The insignificant, operationally flawed performance of the Lebanese Army and the ALA was a tremendous strategic asset for the Israelis who, untroubled on their northern border, could screen Galilee with light forces until it suited them to mass forces for short-burst attacks in the north, as they did in April, May, July, and October–November 1948. The Israelis were thus able to divide an enemy that lacked any sense of military coordination or maneuver warfare, dealing with one Arab front at a time, switching forces to achieve local superiority at critical moments. The examination in this article debunks any residual Lebanese “heroic” perspective on the battle of Malikiyya. It also contributes to the debunking of the “David versus Goliath” idea by adding the missing Lebanese component to the scholarship of the 1948 war—exemplified in *The War for Palestine*—that finds that Israel's military power was superior to that of its disunited Arab opponents whose armies in 1948–49 did not cover themselves in glory.

NOTES

1. Coleman Noahson, “The Lebanese Army Code” (master's thesis, American University of Beirut, 1952), pp. xxx, 4.

2. Walid Khalidi and Yassin Suweyd, *Al-Qadiyya al-Falastiniyya wa al-Khatar al-Nabyuni* [The Palestinian Problem and the Zionist Danger] (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, Lebanese General Staff Fifth Branch & Ministry of Defence, 1973), p. 553.

3. War diaries, 1st, 2d, and 3d *Battalion de Chasseurs Libanais*, 2d battalion of artillery and battalion of tanks/armored cars in author's possession (courtesy of General Yassin Suweyd of the Lebanese army).

4. Author interview, General Yassin Suweyd, 13 March 2004.

5. American Legation Beirut (Pinkerton) to Secretary of State, 13 May 1949 and 15 December 1947, in Gregory Murphy, ed., *US State Department Central Files. Lebanon 1945–1949. Internal Affairs (Decimal Number 890E) and Foreign Affairs (Decimal Numbers 790E and 711.90E)* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1987) (microfilm).

6. American Legation Beirut (Pinkerton) to Secretary of State, 7 July 1949, *US State Department Central Files. Lebanon*.

7. Edward Azar et al., eds., *The Emergence of a New Lebanon: Fantasy or Reality?* (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 82, 84; American Legation Beirut (Pinkerton) to Secretary of State, 7 July 1949, *US State Department Central Files. Lebanon*.

8. War diary, 3d *Battalion de Chasseurs Libanais*, 7–11 May 1948.

9. Azar, *The Emergence*, p. 82; N. E. Bou-Nacklie, “Les Troupes Spéciales: Religious and Ethnic Recruitment, 1916–46,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 25 (1993), p. 653; Nasri Diab, *L'année du destin 1948: le Liban et Israël face à face* (Beirut: FMA, 1993), p. 197; ‘Izzat Haddad, “Mu’assasat al-Jaysh wa al-Mujtama’ fi Lubnan” [The Institution of the Army and Society in Lebanon], *Al-Difa’ al-Watani al-Lubnani* 2 (May 1990), p. 60; Itamar Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon, 1970–1985* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 71; Sami Rihana, *Histoire de l'armée libanaise contemporaine* (Lebanon: Rahbani, 1988), pp. ii, 175.

10. Bou-Nacklie, “Les Troupes Spéciales,” pp. 651–2. See also Oren Barak, “Commemorating Malikiyya: Political Myth, Multiethnic Identity, and the Making of the Lebanese Army,” *History and Memory* 13, no. 1 (2001), p. 65.

11. Azar, *The Emergence*, p. 83. See also Bou-Nacklie, "Les Troupes Spéciales," pp. 651–52.
12. Azar, *The Emergence*, p. 83.
13. Beirut Press Summary 1–7 September 1948 in American Legation Beirut to Secretary of State, 7 September 1948, *US State Department Central Files. Lebanon*.
14. Azar, *The Emergence*, p. 84.
15. American Legation Beirut (Pinkerton) to Secretary of State, 31 December 1947, *US State Department Central Files. Lebanon*.
16. American Legation Beirut to Secretary of State, 23 September 1948, in Paul Kesaris, ed., *US State Department Central Files. Palestine: United Nations Activities 1945–1949 (Decimal Number 501.BB Palestine and 501.MA Palestine)* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1987) (microfilm).
17. Reuven Erlich, *Be-svach ba-levanon, 1918–1958* [The Lebanon Triangle: The Policy of the Zionist Movement and the State of Israel towards Lebanon, 1918–1958] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 2000), pp. 172–73.
18. Kirsten Schulze, *Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon* (Houndmills: Basingstoke, 1998), pp. 27–28.
19. Yoav Gelber, *Nitsanai ba-ba'vatselet* [A Budding Fleur-de-Lis: Israeli Intelligence Services during the War of Independence, 1948–49] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 2000), vol. 1, pp. 467, 495.
20. *Amal* (Beirut), 8 June 1948, p. 2; Diab, *L'année du destin 1948*, p. 216.
21. American Legation Beirut to Secretary of State, 22 July 1948, *US State Department Central Files. Palestine*.
22. American Legation Beirut (Pinkerton) to Secretary of State, 7 January 1949, *US State Department Central Files. Lebanon*. See also Dan Kurzman, *Genesis: The First Arab-Israeli War* (New York: New American Library, 1970), pp. 330–31.
23. Sami Rihana, "Al-Jaysh al-Lubnani: 'Amil Istiqrar wa Tawazun fi al-Bilad' [The Army of Lebanon: An Element of Stability and Balance in the Country], *Al-Difa' al-Watani al-Lubnani* 7 (Jan. 1994), p. 47.
24. Kurzman, *Genesis*, pp. 326, 328. See also Diab, *L'année du destin 1948*, p. 204.
25. Yoav Gelber, *Palestine 1948: War, Escape and the Emergence of the Palestinian Refugee Problem* (Brighton: Sussex Press, 2001), p. 130; Walid Khalidi, *Khamsun 'Am 'ala Harb 1948* [Fifty Years after the 1948 War] (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1998), p. 54; Jon and David Kimche, *Both Sides of the Hill: Britain and the Palestine War* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1960), pp. 128, 149–52.
26. Barak, "Commemorating Malikiyya," p. 66; Khalidi, *Khamsun 'Am*, p. 57.
27. American Legation Beirut (Pinkerton) to Secretary of State, 2 May 1948, *US State Department Central Files. Palestine*.
28. Reuven Erlich and Guy Ma'ayan, "Metoda integrativit le-heker milhemet 1948—ha-mikreh shel qravot malkieh (mai-yuni 1948)" [An Integrative Model to the Research of the War of 1948—The Case of the al-Malikiyya Battles (May–June 1948)], *Historyya* 6 (Aug. 2000), p. 104.
29. "Le rôle des armées syrienne et libanaise dans la campagne de Palestine," *Le Jour* (Beirut), 4 June 1948.
30. *Le Jour* (Beirut), 19 May 1948.
31. American Legation Beirut (Pinkerton) to Secretary of State, 25 May 1948, *US State Department Central Files. Palestine*.
32. War diary, 1st *Battalion de Chasseurs Libanais*, 19 May 1948.
33. Erlich and Ma'ayan, "Metoda integrativit," pp. 118–20; Beirut in Arabic, 24 May 1948, in BBC Written Archives Centre Caversham (BBC), Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) 53/3 (June 1948), p. 69.
34. Netanel Lorch, *Qorot milhemet ba-a'tsmaut* [History of the War of Independence] (Tel Aviv: Masada, 1989 [1959]), pp. 257–64.
35. Some sources give a date of 18–19 May for this assault: Ahmed 'Illaw, *Al-Mu'assasat al-Askariyya al-Lubnaniyya (Al-Jaysb)* [The Lebanese Military Institution (The Army)] (master's thesis, Lebanese Military Institution, 1983), pp. 137–38; Khalidi and Suweyd, *Al-Qadiyya al-Falastiniyya*, pp. 553–54; Kimche, *Both Sides of the Hill*, p. 173. Other sources give 28–29 May for the assault, a figure corroborated by the Yiftach brigade official history: Barak, "Commemorating Malikiyya," p. 66; Erlich and Ma'ayan, "Metoda integrativit," pp. 97–98; IDF History Branch General Staff, *Toldot milhemet ba-qomemiyut*

- [History of the War of Independence] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1959), pp. 174-75; Khalidi, *Kbamsun 'Am*, pp. 57, 58; Lorch, *Qorot milbemet*, pp. 257-64; Yehuda Slutsky, ed., *Sefer toldot ba-baganab, me-ma'avak le-milcbama* [History of the Haganah, from Struggle to War], vol. 3 (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1973), Appendix 2, p. 1596. Yiftach history: Yehuda Helman, *Yiftach: abuzat ba-sufa* [Yiftach: Driven by Storm] (Tel Aviv: Veterans of the Yiftach Brigade, 1970), pp. 98-100, 139, 233ff. Erlich cites both dates: *Be-svach ba-levanon*, pp. 180, 195.
36. Barak, "Commemorating Malikiyya," p. 66; Diab, *L'année du destin 1948*, p. 204; Walid Khalidi, ed., *All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948* (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), pp. 428-29, 470-71.
37. Kimche, *Both Sides of the Hill*, p. 173; war diary, *3d Battalion de Chasseurs Libanais*, May-June 1948; *Le Jour* (Beirut), 17 May 1948; Erlich, *Be-svach ba-levanon*, pp. 180-81.
38. Lorch, *Qorot milbemet*, pp. 257-64; Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, *The Israeli Army* (London: Allen Lane, 1975), p. 34.
39. IDF, *Toldot milbemet*, p. 184.
40. Kurzman, *Genesis*, pp. 331-32.
41. A copy of the military incidents of Sniper Battalion No.3 during the battle for Malikiyya 4-6 June 1948, Report by Battalion Commander, 6 June 1948, in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 9.
42. Edgar O'Ballance, *The Arab-Israeli War, 1948* (London: Faber & Faber, 1956), p. 112.
43. Khayriyya Qasmiyya, ed., *Mufakkarat Fawzi al-Qawuqji, 1912-1948* [Memoirs of Fawzi al-Qawuqji] (Beirut: Dar al-Quds & PLO Research Centre, 1975), vol. 2, pp. 206-9.
44. Author interview, Colonel Ahmed 'Illaw, 11 March 2004.
45. Hani al-Hindi, "Jaysh al-Inqadh, 1947-49" [Salvation Army, 1947-49], *Sbu'un Falastiniyya* 23/24 (July-August 1973), p. 126.
46. Erlich, *Be-svach ba-levanon*, pp. 172-74; Khalidi and Suweyd, *Al-Qadiyya al-Falastiniyya*, pp. 558-59.
47. 'Illaw, *Al-Mu'assasat al-Askarriya*, p. 141; Khalidi and Suweyd, *Al-Qadiyya al-Falastiniyya*, p. 558.
48. Diab, *L'année du destin 1948*, p. 193.
49. Haddad, "Qiyamat al-Jaysh," pp. 6-7, 9; Editorial, *Al-Nabar*, 1 June 1948, p. 1.
50. After Israel's 1982-83 invasion of Lebanon, discussions were held with senior Lebanese officers to try to find the remains of these soldiers.
51. There were also thirteen wounded and a light tank damaged by a mine: Erlich and Ma'ayan, "Metoda integrativit," pp. 118-20; Khalidi and Suweyd, *Al-Qadiyya al-Falastiniyya*, pp. 557-58; author interview, General Yassin Suweyd, Lebanese Army, 13 March 2004. See also Gelber, *Nitsanai*, pp. i, 414; Haddad, "Qiyamat al-Jaysh," p. 9; "Ma'rakat al-Malikiyya" [The Battle of Malikiyya], *Al-Jaysb* 92 (Dec. 1992), p. 58.
52. *Al-Nabar*, 8 June 1948, p. 2; Beirut in Arabic, Arabic News Agency and Damascus in Arabic, 6 June 1948, in BBC, SWB 54/3, 10 June 1948, p. 84; Diab, *L'année du destin 1948*, pp. 215-16; Haddad, "Qiyamat al-Jaysh," p. 8; *Le Jour* (Beirut), 8 June 1948.
53. *Al-Nabar*, 9 June 1948, p. 1; *Beirut*, 11 June 1948, p. 1; 'Illaw, *Al-Mu'assasat al-Askarriya*, pp. 140-41.
54. *Beirut*, 11 June 1948, p. 1.
55. Martin van Creveld, *The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defence Force* (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), p. 74; Trevor Dupuy, *Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 13; Walid Khalidi, ed., *From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971), Appendices 8-9; Nafez Nazzal, "The Zionist Occupation of Western Galilee, 1948" *JPS* 3, no. 3 (Spring, 1974), pp. 198-99; Slutsky, *Sefer toldot*, vol. 3, Appendix 2, p. 1364.
56. Netanel Lorch, *Israel's War of Independence, 1947-1949* (Hartford, CT: Hartmore, 1968), pp. 79-80.
57. Kurzman, *Genesis*, p. 610.
58. Luttwak, *Israeli Army*, p. 40.
59. Kurzman, *Genesis*, p. 332.
60. Rogan and Shlaim, *War for Palestine*, pp. 85, 195-98.
61. Haim Levenberg, *Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine, 1945-48* (London: Frank Cass, 1993), pp. 200-201.

62. Quoted in al-Hindi, "Jaysh al-Inqadh," p. 40.
63. Qasmiyya, *Mufakkarat Fawzi al-Qawuqji*, vol. 2, p. 239.
64. General Volunteer Inspectorate to ALA GOC, 7 June 1948, in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 9/57.
65. Al-Hindi, "Jaysh al-Inqadh," p. 40, 42-43.
66. Al-Hindi, "Jaysh al-Inqadh," p. 47.
67. Quoted in al-Hindi, "Jaysh al-Inqadh," p. 47.
68. Qasmiyya, *Mufakkarat Fawzi al-Qawuqji*, vol. 2, pp. 202-4.
69. Al-Hindi, "Jaysh al-Inqadh," p. 42; see the telegrams in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 11.
70. Diab, *L'année du destin 1948*, pp. 171-72. See also O'Ballance, *Arab-Israeli War*, p. 159.
71. American Legation Beirut to Secretary of State, 16 February 1948, *US State Department Central Files. Lebanon*.
72. Qasmiyya, *Mufakkarat Fawzi al-Qawuqji*, vol. 2, p. 239.
73. Khalidi, *Kbamsun 'Am*, pp. 94-95.
74. Qasmiyya, *Mufakkarat Fawzi al-Qawuqji*, vol. 2, p. 231.
75. Luttwak, *Israeli Army*, p. 42.
76. Khalidi, *Kbamsun 'Am*, p. 111; Qasmiyya, *Mufakkarat Fawzi al-Qawuqji*, pp. ii, 219, 239.
77. Khalidi, *Kbamsun 'Am*, p. 111.
78. Telegram, Shuqayr to al-Hindi, 18 October 1948, in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 11; telegram, Shuqayr to al-Hindi, 26 October 1948, in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 11.
79. Telegram, Shuqayr to Amer, 24 October 1948, in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 11; telegram, Mashour to al-Hindi, 26 October 1948, in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 11; telegram, Mahdi to Shuqayr, 24 October 1948, in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 11; telegrams from July-August 1948 in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 10/2; telegram, General Secretary of Palestinian Salvation Committee to the Head in Baghdad, 8 November 1948, in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 11.
80. Qasmiyya, *Mufakkarat Fawzi al-Qawuqji*, vol. 2, p. 265.
81. Telegram, Qawuqji to Chehab, 28 October 1948, in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 11.
82. Telegram, Qawuqji to al-Hindi, 29 October 1948, in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 11.
83. Telegram, Qawuqji to al-Hindi, 30 October 1948, in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 11 and later telegrams in same file.
84. UN Mediator's HQ Advance Command Post, Haifa, Palestine, Summary of Daily Operation Activities, 2 November 1948, *US State Department Central Files. Palestine*. See also GOC 1st Yarmuk battalion to Qawuqji, 4 November 1948, in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 9/79; Dupuy, *Elusive*, p. 194; telegram, Qawuqji to Amer, 29 October 1948, in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 11.
85. Kurzman, *Genesis*, p. 615.
86. Telegram, Qawuqji to units of ALA, 9 November 1948, in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 11.
87. Lorch, *Israel's War*, p. 456.
88. *Palestine Post*, 1 November 1948.
89. IDF, *Toldot milbemet*, p. 321ff.
90. Eshel, *Hativat carmeli*, p. 295ff.
91. IDF, *Toldot milbemet*, p. 321ff; Lorch, *Israel's War*, p. 456; Van Creveld, *The Sword*, pp. 98-99.
92. 1st Yarmuk battalion casualties [a table] from 29-31 October 1948, in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 9/76 a/b. For rape, see Justice Document from 1948 in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 9/76a.
93. Report by IDF Chief of Operations to Press Correspondents, 21 July 1948, in BBC, SWB, 61/3, 29 July 1948, pp. 68.
94. Qasmiyya, *Mufakkarat Fawzi al-Qawuqji*, vol. 2, p. 231; Khalidi, *Kbamsun 'Am*, p. 111.
95. Qasmiyya, *Mufakkarat Fawzi al-Qawuqji*, pp. ii, 220-21.
96. Tsadok Eshel, *Hativat carmeli be-milbemet ba-qomemiyut* [The Carmeli Brigade in the War of Independence] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1973), pp. 278-79.
97. Qasmiyya, *Mufakkarat Fawzi al-Qawuqji*, vol. 2, p. 267; author interview, General Yassin Suweyd, Lebanese Army, 13 March 2004, with information from *Mawsu'at al-Tarikh al-Lubnani: al-Tarikh al-Siyasi wa al-Askari, 1516-1946* [The Encyclopaedia of Lebanese History: The Political and Military Aspects, 1516-1946] (forthcoming 2004), vol. 9, Khalidi and Suweyd, *Al-Qadiyya al-Falastiniyya*, p. 559.
98. UN Mediator's HQ Advance Command Post, Haifa, Palestine, Summary of Daily Operation Activities, 28 October 1948, *US State Department Central Files. Palestine*.

99. Telegram, Qawuqji to Wazir, 31 October 1948, in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 11.

100. UN Mediator's HQ Advance Command Post, Haifa, Palestine, Summary of Daily Operation Activities, 30 October 1948, *US State Department Central Files. Palestine*; telegram Qawuqji to Shuja', 31 October 1948, in Qawuqji papers, IPS, file 11.

101. Erlich, *Be-svach ha-levanon*, pp. 218-19.

102. American Legation Beirut (Pinkerton) to Secretary of State, 25 March 1949, *US State Department Central Files. Lebanon*.

103. Kurzman, *Genesis*, p. 614.

104. Al-Hindi, "Jaysh al-Inqadh," pp. 127-28; Khalidi, *Kbamsun 'Am*, p. 119; Kurzman, *Genesis*, p. 614.

105. American Legation Beirut (Pinkerton) to Secretary of State, 21 February 1949, *US State Department Central Files. Lebanon*; Khalidi, *Kbamsun 'Am*, p. 143; American Legation Damascus to Secretary of State, 8 December 1948, *US State Department Central Files. Palestine*.

106. American Legation Beirut (Pinkerton) to Secretary of State, 25 March 1949 and 17 June 1949, *US State Department Central Files. Lebanon*.